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Abstract 
 
Kosovo is one of those countries where the claims over the 
territory between two different ethnic groups have always 
ended in blood battles. Different settlements that have been 
reached over the years have always ended in more violence 
due to the failure to address causes of the conflict. The 
latest full scale terror started in February 1998 and 
continued until June 1999, when it was eventually stopped 
by the NATO airstrikes against the Milosevic regime that 
had planned to settle the dispute by ethnic cleansing the 
Albanian community. Unfortunately, the UN lead 
international peace operation that was established at the 
end of the war to administer Kosovo followed the old route 
– it failed to address the causes of the conflict. This lead to 
the failure of promoting a strategy that would weaken the 
nationalist sides from both communities. As a result even 
after ten years from the end of the war there is no hope 
that those two communities will ever live side by side in 
peace for the foreseeable future. Therefore, to avoid the 
reverse ethnic cleansing that started by the Albanians in a 
form of revenge after KFOR entered Kosovo, the presence 
of the international security may have to be there for a very 
long time, thus repeating the Cyprus model. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Kosovo gehört zu jenen Ländern, wo die Ansprüche auf das 
Gebiet zwischen zwei verschiedenen ethnischen Gruppen 
immer in Blutschlachten geendet haben. Zwar wurden im 
Laufe der Zeit verschiedenste Abmachungen erreicht, die 
aber mehr Gewalt erzwungen haben, da das Ziel der Lösung 
des Konflikts verfehlt wurde. Der letzte maßstäbliche Terror 
begann in Februar 1998 und dauerte bis Juni 1999, wo 
dieser Terror schließlich durch NATO Luftangriff gegen das 
Milosevic-Regime beendet wurde, welches im Plan hatte, die 
Eskalation mittels ethnischer Säuberung der albanischen 
Bevölkerung zu lösen. Bedauernswert war, dass die UN am 
Ende des Krieges die internationale Friedensoperation 
eingeleitet hatten, derer Zweck es war Kosovo in alter 
Weise zu verwalten – die Ausrichtung an die Konflikt-
Sachverhalte ist gescheitert. Dies führte zu einer 
mangelhaften Umsetzung der Strategie, welche die 
nationalistischen Seiten von beiden Volksgruppen 
schwächen würde. Als Folge davon, sogar zehn Jahre nach 
dem eigentlichen Ende des Krieges, gibt es keine Hoffnung, 
dass diese zwei Gemeinschaften einmal friedlich 
nebeneinander in der vorsehbaren Zukunft leben könnten. 
Die lange unnötige Präsenz der internationalen 
Gemeinschaft sorgt dafür, ein Zypern-Modell zu 
wiederholen. 
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KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army 
 
KPS – Kosovo Police Service 
 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
 
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 
 
SC – Security Council 
 
SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary General 
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Introduction 
 
Since its creation in 1945, the United Nations (UN 
hereafter) has been involved in many peace operations, 
moving from a relatively quiet period to a dramatic rise of 
conflicts needing international help since the end of the Cold 
War (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001). However, the sharp rise 
in the number of peace operations is not the only change 
that the post Cold War era has experienced. The role that 
the UN plays during these peace operations has changed 
dramatically too. From mainly playing the role of a 
mediator, or monitoring ceasefires which would have 
needed an agreement as a precondition, the UN has moved 
to the position of carrying out its duties in a more complex 
environment (Linden et al, 2007). The intrastate conflicts of 
the last two decades have seen the need for the UN to take 
over many aspects of post conflict life including executive 
powers such as policing, the judicial system and other 
national government powers (Jeong, 2005; Fortna, 2004; 
Reno, 2008). „In particular, Kosovo and East Timor 
constituted the first occasions on which UN peace 
operations exercised full judicial authority within a territory 
and were mandated specifically to establish a state justice 
system‟ (Bull, 2008).  Even though these recent cases have 
shown that the UN lacks the capacity to carry out its new 
duties, calls for more autonomous capabilities in 
peacekeeping have been met with resistance (Hartely and 
Utley, 2006). The size of the UN budget  (Dobbins et al, 
2005) and the existence of a separate military command 
out of the reach of UN hands (Chesterman, 2004), such as 
in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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(Bosnia), have often been used as an excuse for UN 
failures. While these are only two of the many problems 
that need to be paid attention to, I will argue here that in 
order to have a better possibility to successfully perform 
these new duties, the UN would need a more sophisticated 
agenda, with changes being carried out from its very base, 
the UN Charter. Carrying on its new duties, while still using 
the old mechanisms has rendered some to conclude that 
the UN is moving ahead of its capacity, being lead by 
practice rather than a structure and well planned 
intervention (Brahimi Report; Bull, 2008). As a result, the 
chance of success for the twenty-first century UN 
interventions will depend on the circumstances of individual 
cases, with the UN probably making no difference at all. Not 
for the better anyway. Therefore, as the argument goes, I 
will try and put forward changes that the UN has to make in 
order to bring it up to date with the new demands.  This will 
be done by contending that the UN should not be criticised 
for many of international community failures that fall 
beyond its control (Economides, 2007) and suggesting that 
the UN should not get involved in situations for which it has 
no basis nor the means of solving it, as there might be 
regional actors who have a direct interest in a peaceful 
outcome in their region and are better equipped to deal 
with the situation.  Although many of the UN interventions 
are going to be used to support my argument, Kosovo, and 
Bosnia to some extent, will be used as the prime example, 
especially around the problems that can result by the UN‟s 
promotion of liberal democracy in war zones as the only 
means to achieve sustainable peace (Paris, 2004).  Another 
reason why Kosovo will be the centre of the argument is the 
powerful role that the UN had there without much regard to 
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the local population and its lifelong conflict which lay under 
surface ready to erupt at any opportunity. This added more 
to the miscalculation of the situation in Kosovo, the misuse 
of its local talent and loss of opportunity to start rebuilding 
the civil society that would have been the best tool to build 
a new peaceful Kosova (Bush, 2004). Hence, I will argue 
that the UN‟s quick turnaround plans of the messy situation 
in Kosova turned instead into an operation that started 
wrong, it continued that way and that is how it partially 
ended1.  
 
However, the UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) presence did turn things around in the sense that 
the nationality of people who were leaving Kosovo changed. 
The international community ignored the fact, which was 
used to start the military campaign in the first place; that 
Kosovo‟s Albanians had suffered unspeakable atrocities 
right to the day NATO troops entered Kosovo‟s territory. 
Therefore, the memory was fresh, and the thirst for 
revenge was imminent. What was even more important, the 
Albanian population in Kosovo had watched carefully what 
happened in Bosnia, which preceded the war in Kosovo, and 
they saw those first chaotic days as the chance to settle 
Kosovo‟s question once and for all. A „do what you can‟ 
situation of those few first months made the majority of the 
population (regardless of their ethnicity) vulnerable to 
criminals, some of whom came from neighbouring 
countries. The UN, keeping itself busy with political 
uncertainties that surrounded Kosova‟s future, had 
forgotten that its mandate included everyday policing as 
                                               
1 There still remains a small part of the UN administration in the Serb enclaves within Kosova under the mandate 
of Security Council Resolution 1244. 
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well. This policy was followed throughout the UN‟s presence 
in Kosovo, where criminal gangs and their „ordinary‟ 
business were never dealt with separately from the political 
issues, a habit that Kosovo‟s society will follow for many 
years to come. The third big factor that fuelled the 
continuation of ethnic violence was the confused signals 
about Kosovo‟s future coming from the western world which 
were approved by the Security Council Resolution 12442. 
The only people who seemed to have calculated the new 
situation right were most of the Kosovo‟s Serbs who fled 
Kosovo, some even before their own troops. As for the 
international personnel on the ground, the only clear 
mandate at that stage seemed to have been the monitoring 
of Serb troops leaving Kosovo (which was carried out by the 
NATO troops that were not under the UN command). Every 
other action had yet to be agreed upon on the ground due 
to the confusing statements that Resolution 1244 contained 
about the mandate as a whole. 
The argument will be focused particularly on the UN Civilian 
Police (CIVPOL) and the rule of law as one of the most 
important aspects of a stable and peaceful society. 
Examples from my experience on the receiving end of a 
peace operation will also be used where relevant.   
 
 
                              
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 Resolution 1244 became the umbrella that covered both the UN mandate in Kosovo and everything else that 
was not meant to happen there, rising big questions about Human Rights issues and extensive powers that the 
Head of UN administration had in Kosovo.  
 11 
 
The layout of the dissertation                          
    
The paper is divided into five chapters.  
 
The first chapter will deal briefly with the creation of the 
UN, its structures, procedures and other conditions that 
have to be fulfilled to enable a peace operation.  Attention 
will be drawn to the lack of knowledge, especially on the 
part of the hosting country‟s population, on how the UN 
works and how the lack of information on these procedures 
affects an operation even before it beginns.  
 
The second chapter will talk about the history of peace 
operations from the creation of the UN up to date. The 
argument will mainly focus on the post Cold War period, 
which was characterised with more complex peace 
operations and the idea of promoting liberal democracy as a 
means of achieving long lasting peace.  
 
The role of the CIVPOL and its difficulties during peace 
operations will be discussed in chapter three. The case of 
Kosovo will be used to point out the negative outcomes that 
can result from the CIVPOL diversity and a lack of 
knowledge about local laws, norms and culture on one side, 
and a lack of knowledge about the norms and cultures of 
other CIVPOL members on the other.  
 
Chapter four will then move on to the troubled issue of 
institutional accountability. This part will be used to shed 
some light about the (lack of) accountability measures on 
the part of the UN. Kosova will be used again as an example 
to tackle this issue. 
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The question of how a UN operation ends, or in some cases 
why does it last „forever‟, will be discussed in the final 
chapter. The much argued problem about how to calculate 
success or failure, and who is to be praised and blamed 
respectively will also be part of this chapter.  The final part 
of this chapter (conclusion) will briefly touch the decision of 
the International Court of Justice on Kosovo‟s declaration of 
independence. 
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Chapter One 
The UN and its Structures and Procedures 
 
  
Having failed to govern the international community and 
thus prevent the beginning of World War II through the 
League of Nations, fresh attempts were made by the United 
States during that war to form a new international 
organisation that would assist to manage future conflicts 
(Hilderband, 1999). These attempts culminated in 1945 
with the creation of the UN which succeeded the League of 
Nations. The primary principle for creating the UN was to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and 
collectively maintain international peace and security, which 
is clearly stated in the preamble of its Charter. The 
problem, however, was to find a way to enforce these 
principles. The final agreement upon which the UN was 
meant to enforce the peace ended up in a déjà vu (a new 
League of Nations, with a slightly different name, and no 
independent authority to enforce its principles).  Even 
though the world order (or to keep ourselves correct, the 
world disorder) has changed dramatically since then, the UN 
has remained relatively the same, falling far behind in 
trying to catch up with, rather than lead the troubled 
societies that it is meant to deal with. A simple explanation 
of this stagnation may rest upon the belief that the UN 
never had any real power to make political decisions 
(Bolton, 1997). However, that is not the case when the 
permanent members agree upon a certain issue3. 
Therefore, in order to understand the complicated nature of 
                                               
3 United States, The Soviet Union, United Kingdom, China and France 
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the UN and its peace mandates, there are a few very 
important points to be made about the structure and the 
organisation of the UN that play a crucial role to how it 
operates and why it fails to deliver. Despite their 
importance, a substantial amount of the academic literature 
that focuses on the UN peace operations fails to discuss all 
the mandatory requirements or even mention them as part 
of the overall picture. Instead, an easier answer is sought, 
that of blaming the UN for many failures that go far beyond 
its powers as a collective international organisation.    
                                                    
Article 7 of the UN Charter lists six principle organs that 
carry out UN duties4. The UN Security Council (SC) is the 
organ that plays the most important role in the 
maintenance and restoration of international peace and 
security (Saroshi, 1999). Since the argument here is 
primarily about the UN‟s role in peace operations, it is the 
SC‟s role and its dealings that I will concentrate on. It is 
stated in Article 24 of the Charter that UN members confer 
primary responsibility to the SC for the maintenance and 
restoration of international peace and security. To achieve 
this objective, the SC has been given specific powers which 
are contained in Chapter VII (Saroshi, 1999). However, as 
James (1988) explains, the Charter gives the SC conflicting 
directions. The first is the authoritative decision that the SC 
has under Article 24 (above). The second is the right to 
veto given to the all five permanent members5. In other 
words, the veto means „that there would be many occasions 
on which peace may be threatened or broken, but in 
respect of which the Council would be unable to act‟ 
                                               
4 For a detailed information about UN bodies and other structural and organisational 
information see the UN website at www.un.org  
5 Article 27 of the charter lists the voting requirements in more detail. 
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(James, 1988:77). Needless to say that many people who 
follow the work of the UN have seen those occasions 
becoming real many times. 
 
One of the examples that echo the powerful nature of the 
right to veto, even if it is one against the world, is the case 
of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a UN-Secretary General who was 
forced out of his post by the United States (US) in 1996 
despite the support of all the other SC members (including 
all the temporary ones). Even though, in order to reach a 
conclusion, the process of voting in the SC gets complicated 
when one of the permanent members has used its right to 
veto6, it is not the technical side of the voting that will make 
any difference, rather the outcome of that process that 
works against UN principles and makes it ineffective. The 
words of Boutros-Ghali himself, written on the book he 
dedicated to his candidature for re-election as a UN 
Secretary General, explain better than anything else the 
impossibility of the UN to take any independent action:  
The US veto was a rejection of democracy... The fact that a 
single vote... could dictate the outcome at the United 
Nations threatened hopes for increasing democratization on 
the international scene (1999: 318).  
Amongst many reasons why I chose this passage is the 
word „hope‟ mentioned in it. One of the problems that 
seemed to have followed the UN from its birth was between 
what it was hoped to do versus what it can do.  
 
At the beginning, „the UN idea called upon the major 
nations to act unselfishly at their moment of final victory in 
                                               
6 For a wider explanation on the voting process see the UN website www.un.org, 
alternatively Boutros-Ghali (1999) gives an extensive explanation in his book 
„Unvanquished‟.  
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the Second World War‟ (Hilderbrand, 1990: ix). They were 
asked to pass on their authority to the UN. Clearly, that was 
not going to happen. It was rather naive to believe 
otherwise. In the end the major powers agreed that the 
peace and security they would maintain through the UN 
would have to be within their national interests.  Retaining 
the veto power was a guarantee that the future of the UN 
will always be dictated by the interests of the powers who 
created it. If they shared a common goal, the UN would be 
used as a cover for the permanent five to enhance their 
positions (Bolton, 1997). If, however, their interests 
happened to conflict, they will look for alternative ways, 
bypassing the UN. It was not long before the latter 
happened. The disagreements that followed between US 
and the Soviet Union, which started what is widely known 
as the Cold War, put the UN into the ineffective position as 
mentioned above. Instead, the world powers dealt with 
international matters individually. 
 
This remained the case for the next four decades, with the 
UN being involved in „face-saving‟ decisions and 
deployments, occasionally, during that time (James, 1988). 
However, the world order started to change during the late 
1980‟s. As the Cold War ended, so did the willingness of big 
powers to try and maintain more allies, hence waste time 
and money to keep them under control (Paris, 2004). “A 
funny thing happened to UN [during that time]...it became 
a major player in the global security affairs” (Hillen, 
1997:111). The intrastate conflicts, of countries such as 
Yugoslavia, brought the UN back to the negotiating table 
again. Heavy reliance from its outset of the Clinton 
administration in the UN could be seen as one of the 
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reasons for this new comeback (Bolton, 1997). The 
assumptions that the bankruptcy of the Russian 
government would make it easier to coerce the Russian 
political elite to collaborate with the west should not be 
overlooked either.   
 
However, these new types of conflicts put the UN and its SC 
under even heavier constrains. As well as having to deal 
with the old problems, the post Cold War warring parties 
share a territory that belonged to the same sovereign state. 
It is especially difficult, as these sorts of conflicts have their 
routes back to the Second World War, if not earlier. Thus 
some of the permanent members have to watch their own 
back, Russia being one of them. Therefore, getting any 
international action past the SC is going to be impossible as 
it happened with Yugoslavia when the US was trying to sort 
out that region through the UN. Even though the Russian 
Federation was falling apart, its place within the SC was as 
strong as ever, especially if China was willing to back up 
Russia rather than the West. All in all the Charter 
guarantees the sovereignty of every country, hence, 
attempting to find conditions that would please all the 
permanent members resulted in prolonging any 
international intervention. This meant an escalation of the 
conflict and finally NATO‟s intervention without any UN 
mandate as happened in Kosovo, sparking a debate about a 
breach of international law (Economides, 2007) and causing 
unnecessary delays to stop the ethnic cleansing that was 
happening on the doorstep of a modern Europe.  
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Misconceptions about the UN amongst local 
populations 
 
Before the conflict had escalated into an armed 
confrontation in other parts of Yugoslavia, the majority of 
Kosovars (including me) had hardly heard about the UN. 
The way it became known to them was not welcoming 
either. It started with the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia, 
and Kosova with its „rebellion‟ population suffered from 
those sanctions very heavily.  As the conflict was unfolding 
in Kosova in following years, the SC became an organ that 
„unintentionally was helping‟ Serbia and its illusionary cause 
over the territory. Intervening in Kosovo without the UN‟s 
„permeation‟ had another major consequence on how the 
conflict developed during the NATO‟s air campaign and how 
people of Kosovo would view the UN in the days to come. 
The SC disagreements were being used by Serbia in at least 
two ways. Firstly, the prolonged talks in the SC, resulting 
with no action, prior and during the NATO bombardment, 
were giving Milosevic more time to continue his terror over 
the Albanian population in an unprecedented way. 
Secondly, he tried to excuse his actions in the name of 
international law, „relying‟ on the SC as the highest 
international authority that was „supporting‟ Yugoslavia to 
protect its sovereignty (probably he was surprised himself 
with the length of time he managed to carry on). The 
propaganda that the Serbian government was using was a 
mere icing on the cake to enforce the views of the locals 
about the UN. The massacre of Srebrenica under the UN‟s 
presence in Bosnia had already proven to locals and the 
whole world that the UN was ineffective in dealing with 
internal conflicts.  Finally, when the SC Resolution 1244 
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accepted a modified reality in Kosova, its population had 
already made up their minds about the UN. The lack of 
knowledge on how the UN worked and the propaganda that 
Serbia used at the time of war in Kosovo made Kofi Annan 
(the then Secretary General), the public face of the UN, 
probably one of the most hated figures amongst the 
Albanian population in Kosovo during that period. On the 
other hand, trying to overcome its defects (the veto 
experience), the SC came up with a resolution that was 
very ambiguous and the United Nation‟s Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) became the 
example of an impossible mandate (Linden et al, 2007). The 
Resolution gave UNIMK the mandate of an interim 
administration over Kosovo, but left unanswered the 
underlying cause of conflict – who would rule Kosovo after 
(King and Mason, 2006, Bull, 2008). That was one of the 
signs that raised the question of not if UNMIK would fail, 
rather when.  
The acronym UNMIK7 did not have a very good start either.  
      „Once the operation was on the ground, it was 
discovered that “a n m i k”, in the dialect of Albanian 
spoken in Kosovo, means “e n e m y”. No one within the UN 
was aware of the confusion until it was too late, at which 
time instructions went out to pronounce the acronym “oon-
mik” „ (Chesterman, 2001: 4).  
 
 While the UN was left to deal with the mess, the confusion 
that surrounded the international presence in Kosovo lasted 
for almost a decade until its Parliament declared unilateral 
independence, for which Kosovo had already decided 
                                               
7 It is typical of the UN to use acronyms for its operations  
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eighteen years previously8. Despite the latest developments 
in Kosovo, the UN has still not found a way to finally close 
the embarrassing chapter about its performance there. 
Even though no high profile figure has ever said it 
publically, the UN had to be kicked out of those parts of 
Kosova with an Albanian majority after Kosovo was 
recognised as an independent state by the most powerful 
UN members9. Amazingly, UNMIK still remains in the 
Serbian enclaves, over which it never had authority 
anyway.   
 
Even though the right to veto is one of the most obvious 
examples of the UN‟s impossibility to deal with any conflicts 
impartially, it is the easiest way to prove that in order for 
the UN to promote peace and democracy, its headquarters 
is the place to start. Otherwise, the UN should not continue 
in the present form, especially in cases where the UN 
performs the most fundamental functions of a state10. As 
Bolton (1997) suggests, if America had decided to go into 
Bosnia on its own and not wait for the SC to make its mind 
up, it would have saved the American people a lot of 
money, and it would have saved Bosnia a lot of people. 
Hence, the timing of an intervention can be far more 
important than the huge effort that the international 
community places when it is too late. Therefore, to make 
the UN far more efficient in its duty to maintain peace and 
security, Groom (1971) sees the waiving of the right to veto 
as the best way forward. 
 
                                               
8 Kosovo‟s Albanians had declared unilateral independence in July 1990. However, Albania 
was the only country that recognised it.  
9 A European Union (EU) lead authority still exists in Kosova. Its main aim is to monitor 
and help Kosovo reach the required standards to join the EU. 
10 I base this assumption on my personal experience in Kosova, where the presence of UN 
there, at best paralysed everything, at worst things were moving backwards.  
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Chapter Two 
                                       
From Peacekeeping to Peace-building: UN Peace 
operations and its promotion of democracy, the 
„one size fits all‟ approach 
 
Peacekeeping 
 
Even though there is no agreed definition of peacekeeping 
(Goulding, 1993; Groom, 1971), in his „Agenda for Peace‟, 
the then Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali defined 
peacekeeping in the following terms: 
„Peacekeeping is a deployment of a UN presence in the field, 
hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, 
normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and 
frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that 
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict 
and the making of peace‟ (1992: para 20), put simply, this 
definition of peacekeeping covers everything that the UN 
does during its presence in a particular territory. The UN‟s 
official website also conveys peacekeeping under this broad 
and vague approach, acknowledging that peacekeeping “is 
not mentioned in the Charter and defies simple definition”11. 
However, some authors have chosen to define 
peacekeeping in more narrow terms. For example Paris 
defines it as follows:  
„Peacekeeping is the deployment of the lightly armed, 
multinational contingent of military personnel for non-
enforcement purposes, such as the observation of a 
ceasefire” (2004:38).  
                                               
11 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp 
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Although Paris is talking about what is known „traditional‟ 
peacekeeping, I will go back to Boutros-Ghali‟s definition as 
it makes a crucial distinction about what is and what is not 
peacekeeping.   If studied in detail, the peacekeeping that 
he is talking about will not cover those UN operations where 
the consent of all the parties concerned is not acquired. In 
it, the above definition seems to draw a line between those 
operations where the parties concerned agree to the UN‟s 
presence in their territory, and the rest of the operations, 
where due to the nature of the conflict, there could be 
factions, who have strong influence upon a community 
group that oppose any agreement being imposed upon 
them. The latter problems are typical of intrastate conflicts 
that the UN has been involved after the Cold War, where 
the lack of state authority is the biggest challenge for the 
peace operation. For the sake of the argument I will take 
peacekeeping to mean an operation that starts after an 
agreement has been reached, either by use of force, or 
diplomatic negotiations between the parties to a conflict. 
Therefore the peace has already been achieved and the UN 
or any other third party takes the positions of keeping (or 
maintaining) that peace. Thus my idea of peacekeeping 
agrees with both Paris and Boutros-Ghali‟s definition, even 
though the framework of the operation will depend on how 
the agreement was reached. 
 
First, if peace was achieved through diplomatic 
negotiations, then we are leaning towards „traditional‟ 
peacekeeping, which lasted from 1948 to 1989 (Chopra, 
1998). During that time „[as] a consequence of diplomacy, 
limited military forces and civilian personnel were deployed 
symbolically to guarantee a negotiated settlement, 
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invariably between two sovereign states‟ (ibid: 3). Due to 
the contradictions that existed between the world‟s two 
superpowers (the Soviet Union and US) this sort of 
peacekeeping was very limited. Therefore, the UN 
operations were based upon certain principles in order to 
avoid a possible clash between the two masters (Paris, 
2004). Even though the list of these principles varies 
depending on the views of different authors, they more or 
less paint the same picture. Hence a generalised criterion of 
„traditional‟ peacekeeping would include these principles: 
the UN peacekeepers would only be deployed with the 
consent of all parties; they had to be impartial between the 
parties; the use of force was limited to self defence and the 
UN was not to be involved in domestic affairs of any state 
(Hartley and Utley, 2006: 3; Paris, 2004: 15; Goulding, 
1993: 453-455). Except for the two missions that deviated 
from the „traditional‟ peacekeeping, the UN operation in the 
Republic of Congo in 1960 and the mission in New Guinea in 
1962, those principles guided the Cold War UN (Paris, 
2004).  Since my discussion is targeting the post Cold War 
era, I will not cover this period in more detail.  
Secondly, if peace has been achieved through the use of 
force12 by the international community and the agreement, 
while achieved in theory, does not work well in practice due 
to many strings attached to it, the peacekeeping operation 
will be part of a much more complicated process widely 
known as peace-building. It is this process that I will now 
turn to. 
 
 
                                               
12 The use of force: I refer to heavy measures that are taken by the international 
community to pressurise the parties to a conflict to reach an agreement. Military 
intervention would be the last resort of these heavy measures.  
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Peace-building versus Democratisation in Kosovo and post-
Dayton Bosnia  
  
 
„It is more difficult to organise a peace than to win a war, 
but the fruits of victory will be lost if the peace is not 
organised‟ 
                                                                                          By Aristotle 
 
The challenges of peace-building start with the term itself. 
Peace-building was introduced by the Head of the UN in his 
above mentioned An Agenda for Peace, and it became part 
of the UN language and the literature in this field ever 
since. When first mentioned, peace-building was meant to 
be a post-conflict reconstruction of social and political 
activities, aiming to avoid a relapse into conflict (Boutros-
Ghali, 1992: para. 55). While that still remains the main 
aim, due to the unforeseen circumstances on the ground, 
peace-building started as a contested definition and it has 
remained like that throughout. However, I will not go down 
the route of considering different discussions of peace-
building as such, as it will not enhance the purpose of our 
discussion. Instead, I will argue around the idea of peace as 
a fruit of democracy, and the relation between the two. The 
modern time UN has used the method of enforcing liberal 
democracy upon societies that have experienced internal 
conflict as a means of achieving a long lasting peace 
(Belloni, 2007).  In my attempt to argue that the 
international community in general and the UN in particular, 
has done its maths wrong (if it has done any at all) I will try 
and develop the debate around the following questions:  
Are peace and democracy rivals or partners? Is the 
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promotion of democracy the best way to address an 
ethnically motivated conflict? In a chaotic situation, is it 
peace that fosters democracy or the other way around? 
Unless there is an answer to these questions based on 
practical evidence, the UN will never get it right. Therefore 
my argument will be based on the situation in Kosovo and 
post Dayton Bosnia as practical examples. 
                  
Theoretical attempts to describe either peace or democracy 
have lead to more questions than answers, thus 
complicating matters further when these theories are tried 
in practice, even more so if “effective implementation of 
individual or overall policies requires compelling definition of 
peace”  (Jeong, 2005: 21). In the recent years the UN 
version of peace  has moved from a „negative peace‟ (the 
absence of an armed conflict) to a higher standard known 
as „positive peace‟ (meaning more than just the absence of 
war, human rights being the most obvious example), which 
requires the need for a fundamental reorder of international 
priorities (Chandler, 2006: 166). While these priorities have 
changed in practice, the fundamental problem with the UN 
is its continuation of using old and worn doctrines in its 
response (Chopra, 1998). On the other hand the difficulty 
that arises around the term „democracy‟ is twofold: as a 
concept it is essentially contested; as a model there is no 
settled one that is applied everywhere (Heywood, 2004). 
However, the argument here will follow two very simple 
guidelines for both peace and democracy in order to 
examine the role of third party interventions. I will consider 
sustainable peace to be „a collective good to redress the 
past legacy of violent conflict, helping the population 
overcome extreme vulnerability and move toward self-
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sufficiency‟ (Jeong 2005: 21). Whereas democracy will be 
established if there is a presence of political competition, 
free election, rule of law, market economy and also an 
active civil society for which the freedom of expression is 
the first necessity.  
To make the first step right, it is very important that the 
international community and the hosting society interpret 
common goals in exactly the same terms. There was no 
presence of common goals in Kosovo or Bosnia. The 
ambiguity that surrounded Resolution 1244, which set up 
the framework of UNMIK in Kosovo, is a typical example of 
the confusion that surrounds the UN interventions. Bosnia 
experienced an even messier situation. The UN 
peacekeeping mission there „was based in no less than 
seventy different SC resolutions (Einsiedel, 2002). Having 
to read seventy lines will be confusing enough for 
international community members, many of whom only 
have basic knowledge of English and are deployed on a six 
month contract, never mind the seventy resolutions that 
have no real possibility of being enforced in practice. Both 
operations will be looked at closely after an insight of 
Kosova‟s and Bosnia‟s conflicts which will be necessary to 
understand the theory of the wrong approach.  
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A short recap of history 
  
The modern history of the Balkans is closely connected with 
the rule of the Ottoman Empire (if not earlier) which 
administrated that territory for five centuries. During that 
time each nation made its own history in the name of 
victimization and patriotism which was passed on fanatically 
to the next generation. Therefore, it is very difficult to 
establish a common history that is not connected with 
border changes and ethnic cleansing. I have read countless 
books about the history of the Balkans: the Albanian 
version, the Serbian version, the Croatian version and the 
international version. Each one of them establishes different 
claims; the locals‟ in their favor and the international 
version widely depends on whose books the authors were 
reading. As a result, except for the few established facts, 
the truth will depend on who you choose to believe. Hence I 
will try and mention only those facts that I consider to be 
important and should have been taken into account by the 
UN. 
 
Before its final disintegration13 the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) was made of six republics and 
two autonomous provinces. Kosovo was one of the 
provinces and Bosnia was one of the republics. In Kosovo, 
Albanians counted for the overwhelming majority (between 
90 and 93%)14 of its population, while Bosnia‟s ethnicities 
were more balanced (Bosnian Muslims 44%, Serbs 33% 
                                               
13 Yugoslavia was disintegrated during World War II, and its short lived modern statue 
was created after that war.  
14 The consensus conducted in Kosovo have always been overshadowed by ethnic claims 
between communities, therefore a credible figure is still to be decided, however that 
would only bring the Albanian percentage higher, due to the difference of natality which is 
lot higher amongst Albanian community.   
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and Croats 17%) (Woodward, 1999: 141-142).  Despite the 
fact that many consider the constitution of 1974 to have 
enhanced the autonomous statute of Kosovo (Staubb, 
2009), the Albanians were not happy as their long old 
aspiration was to have Kosovo as the seventh republic, 
which would have brought them a step closer to their 
ultimate aim – secession from Yugoslavia. As a result new 
clashes reemerged in Kosovo in 1981 when the rest of 
Yugoslavia was quiet (King and Mason, 2006: 3).  
Even though they had lived beside each other for as long as 
they could remember „the rift between Serbs and Albanians 
in Kosovo was deeper than that between any of other 
nationalities in Yugoslavia‟ (Ibid: 2). Throughout all the 
wars that befell the Balkans, the Kosovo Albanians always 
tried to find a way to be part of their „mother Albania‟ and 
they always made that clear. Yet they were too powerless 
to change their fate. The Serbs on the other side considered 
Kosova to be „the cradle‟ of Serbia and the Serbian nation15 
(Economides, 2007: 218). The claim over the territory was 
always a dispute that was resolved by force in the Serbian 
favor16 while Albanians had to wait for the next opportunity. 
Despite the break of active violence between the two world 
wars and after World War II, the Serbs and the Albanians in 
Kosovo always considered each other as their worst enemy. 
They spoke very different languages which played a big part 
in their division. Inter ethnic marriages were very rare and 
family friendships were not common either. I remember the 
late 1980s as a young child when we had to go to the same 
school building with the Serbian children and play in the 
                                               
15 This goes all the way back to the battle of Kosovo in 1389. In that Battle Serbians lost 
heavily while trying to fight the Ottoman Empire 
16 The Albanians (rightly) hold the belief that Kosovo was given to Serbia because of its 
ties with Russia, and Russia being on the victorious side in both world wars. 
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same playground. Yet, we would not talk to each other and 
we were „not allowed‟ to become friends. They had their 
side, we had ours. It was not long before we, the Albanian 
children and our teacher‟s, were denied our side of the 
school by the huge padlock on the school gate. Everybody 
knew that worse times were ahead of us. We were lucky in 
the sense that other parts of Yugoslavia experienced the 
horror before us, maturing the international community to 
react quicker when Kosovo became a battle ground. 
On the other hand, Bosnia‟s population spoke the same 
language17 and the inter-ethnic marriage rate was a lot 
higher than in Kosova. However, the Serbians counted for 
third of the population which gave Serbia a bigger „reason‟ 
to keep Bosnia within Yugoslavia where Serbs had become 
the rulers. After Slovenia and Croatia (two other republics 
within Yugoslavia) declared independence, Croatians within 
Bosnia no longer wanted to be part of Yugoslavia.  Hence 
Bosnia was in a middle of cross roads with no signposts for 
directions. Being pushed by the European Community, 
Bosnia held a referendum, the result of which favored 
independence since the Serbs had decided to boycott it 
(Cox, 2008: 252). After Western countries started to 
recognize Croatia and Bosnia as sovereign states, territorial 
claims became an agenda for war. As Cox puts it: 
 
„Ethnic cleansing was not a side effect of war but an explicit 
aim of the Bosnian Serbs and Croat armies designed to 
shatter Bosnia‟s complex ethnic mosaic and establish 
territorial claims‟ (2008: 257). 
                                               
17 I realise how important it is for people in ex-Yugoslavia to be identified with different 
languages, therefore I do apologise for considering Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian to be 
the same language. However, everybody has to admit that they are so similar that for 
decades Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims spoke Serbo-Croatian.   
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The inside (and outside) borders of Yugoslavia crossed right 
through communities that belonged to the same nation. 
While that was not a major problem when they were used 
merely as administrative borders, altering them to state 
borders was not going to be easy. That is why „the crisis in 
Yugoslavia were brutally complex and the UN and the 
regional organizations utterly inexperienced and unprepared 
for dealing with peace and order in the post-Cold War world‟ 
(Economides, 2007: 67).  
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The Dayton Agreement and Resolution 1244 
 
After almost three years of ineffective attempts to resolve 
the situation in Bosnia through the UN and its mass 
production resolutions18, NATO started its Operation 
Deliberate Force against the Serbian army in Bosnia. It 
started after thousands of Bosnian Muslims were killed in 
July 1995, and many more thousands cleansed by Serbs 
while in the care of the UN in Srebrenica. The NATO 
operation resulted in the internationally coerced Dayton 
Agreement (Cox, 2008), which was designed by Richard 
Holbrook. It was signed in Dayton - Ohio, after the Bosnian 
leader, and the Serbian and Croatian presidents were „held‟ 
there until they had no options but to sign the Agreement 
(Holbrook, 1998). „The Dayton Agreement explicitly sought 
to transform Bosnia into a liberal democracy on the 
assumption that doing so would reduce the likelihood of 
renewed fighting‟ (Paris, 2004: 99).   
 
Kosovo went through a similar route. Having been 
neglected and not even mentioned in the Dayton 
Agreement, many Albanians decided to call their passive 
resistance as a missed shot. They came to the conclusion 
that the international community would only react to 
violence (O‟ Neill, 2002). As a result, the Kosova Liberation 
Army (KLA) intensified their attacks on Serbian forces, who 
were concentrating in Kosova to „protect‟ the Serbs. The 
Serbian army19, paramilitaries, and many local Serb 
civilians answered by internally displacing Albanians by 
                                               
18 A total of seventy resolutions were passed during UN‟s presence in Bosnia. 
19 I decline to use the term Yugoslavian army at this stage, as there was no such thing 
left. The only army fighting at this time was the one orchestrated by the Serbian 
government. 
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torturing, raping, killing, massacring and destroying their 
property. After futile attempts to solve the conflict by 
peaceful means, NATO bypassed the SC and entered into 
war with the Yugoslavian (namely Serbian) government. 
After seventy-eight days of airstrikes, another coerced 
Agreement was signed between the international 
community and Milosevic which ended the war and the 
passing of the SC Resolution 1244.  
 
 
 
What was wrong with both Agreements? 
   
In both cases the agreements reflected the bargaining of 
the SC members, especially Russia and the US, rather that 
of the parties upon whom the conditions were forced. They 
were ambiguous and very difficult to apply in practice 
(Chesterman, 2001). Both international operations that 
were deployed as a result, sought to transform those 
societies into democratic ones (Paris, 2004). Achieving a 
long lasting peace was the ultimate aim.  However as 
Rothstein notes: 
„a weak peace agreement rarely produces genuine peace, 
that is a situation in which both sides accept the need for 
painful compromises of long term goals‟ (1999: 223).   
Because of its coercive nature, the agreement did not 
produce peace as a result of its implementation, but due to 
the heavy presence of NATO that is still present there. That 
democracy will bring peace to the region was a foregone 
conclusion based upon the assumption that democracies do 
not fight wars against each other (Schultz, 2001: 10). While 
that may be true, democracies do fight wars against other 
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states (ibid), furthermore, Kosovo and Bosnia had to sort 
themselves internally. Since there is no evidence of the 
pacifying effects of liberalization in post civil conflict 
societies, the assumption was based on a mere hope (Paris, 
2004). One very important fact is that democracies are rich 
and powerful; the unemployment is very low with less 
space for trouble. That is never the case in societies that 
come out of a civil conflict. Also a blind eye was turned to 
the fact that it was the first democratic elections in 
Yugoslavia that started shaking its foundations which ended 
up in a blood bath.  Yugoslavia‟s population had been held 
together by force throughout communism, which was not 
possible in a democracy, they were now free to decide what 
they wanted to do (Mesic, 2007)20. Taking all this into 
account, the yardstick for a short term solution should have 
been measured against the individual circumstances, while 
properly planning a long term solution (Call and Cook, 
2003). Rushing Bosnia and later Kosovo into democracy 
only guaranteed one thing – the international community 
was going to be there for a long time.  
 
Even though there are many similarities between peace-
building operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the major 
difference was the final statute of each territory. Bosnia was 
a sovereign state while Kosova‟s final statute was yet to be 
decided. For some, the unresolved final statute of Kosovo 
has been considered as the major drawback for the 
peacebuilders there (Bull 2008). If that is the reason, why 
is Bosnia being held back? It has been argued that „effective 
                                               
20 Mesic was the last president of Yugoslav Federation. He lectured at Queen‟s University 
on the 17/10/2007 where I was present. The phrase is part of the answer to the question: 
„Since Yugoslavia fell apart under your rule, do you feel responsible not to have done 
more to keep it together‟? 
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peacebuilding requires a privilege of conflict resolution over 
other goals‟ (Cousens, 2001). Starting with democracy did 
not solve that in Bosnia. What was worse; as the 
international community wanted to make sure that Bosnia 
will never have a strong central government, The Dayton 
Agreement provided that Bosnia is divided upon ethnic 
lines, Serbs got their own republic (Republica Serbska), 
while Croats and Bosnian Muslims ended up with a 
federation, thus reinforcing the causes of the conflict21. 
Holbrooke had managed to create a miniature Yugoslavia 
within Bosnia. The worst step yet was to give the new 
entities strong political powers. If „peacebuilding is not 
about imposition of solutions, [rather] it is about the 
creation of opportunities‟ (Keating and Knight, 2004: xvii), 
the opportunities that were being created in Bosnia were 
the wrong ones. Democratic elections that were held too 
soon in Bosnia „strengthened the very separatists who had 
started the war (Holbrooke, 1998: 344). The freedom of 
speech ended up being used as a way to strengthen hate 
between different communities. To sum up, the Dayton 
Agreement had created the opportunity for elites in Bosnia 
to continue the war by peaceful means (Woodward, 1999). 
As a result nothing was getting done in Bosnia and the High 
Representative (of nobody) ended up with unlimited 
powers, which were used as late as July 2009 (Perelec, 
2009).  
On the other hand, peacebuilding in Kosovo was chasing its 
tail from the very beginning. The west decided to introduce 
democracy and a market economy in a post-conflict country 
that had no army, no police, no elected government (in fact 
                                               
21 To appreciate the injustice that was done in Bosnia, the shape of the actual map is the 
best possible example. 
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it had three different bodies governing it, two of which were 
illegal), „no standard currency, no official government 
services, no proper benefits system, few private services 
except importing, and no banking system‟ (King and Mason, 
2006: 86). Above all there was no clear strategy how to 
impose this great idea of democracy upon a population that 
amongst everything else was missing food and a roof over 
their head. Since the Resolution 1244 gave Kosovo 
substantial autonomy (but never explained what that really 
meant), yet recognized the sovereignty of Yugoslavia 
(which no longer existed in its original form of a state), 
nobody in Kosovo knew where they were heading to. 
Kosovo‟s population ended up electing new members of the 
parliament that had no powers to decide anything without 
the approval of the head of UNMIK. Probably it was not 
anticipated from the beginning that giving democratic 
freedom to an over ninety percent majority poses a very 
high risk in ethnically divided societies. In situations were 
minorities hold different views, such as in Kosovo, or Bosnia 
for that matter, „democracy may end up in a new form of 
tyranny, that of the tyranny of the majority, in which the 
rights of the individuals comprising the minority are ignored 
and violated‟ (Blaug and Schwartzmantel, 2004: 175). 
However to avoid that, in both cases, the international 
community used measures that violated not only the rights 
of the minority, but the rights of everybody. In Bosnia it 
was the High Representative, who, as the joke went, could 
decide who lives in what house. Whereas in Kosovo, every 
important decision ended up being proposed, approved and 
implemented by the same person: the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) who also 
was the head of UNMIK. The paralyzed economy of Kosova 
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was not making any progress and the public services were 
in a state of disgrace. Due to the lack of any form of 
accountability and proper institutions, there was plenty of 
finger pointing but no one to take the blame. The burst of 
ethnic violence in March 2004 was the best evidence to 
prove that Kosovo was moving backwards and the UN had 
failed to prove its worth.     
 
 Peace and Stability in Bosnia [and Kosova] depend on their 
capacity to survive and function as a country (Woodward, 
1999). In order to have a peaceful transition, they need to 
have a government that is acceptable to everybody (Jeong, 
2005). To achieve that, institutionalizing before 
democratizing has been suggested as a more realistic 
approach:  
„What is needed in the immediate post conflict period is not 
democratic ferment and economic upheaval, but political 
stability and the establishment of effective administration 
over the territory‟ (Paris, 2004: 187).  
Paris believes that in the short run, political and economic 
freedoms should be limited, thus delaying the liberalization. 
By doing that, better opportunities and conditions will be 
created for democratization and durable peace in the long 
run. In other words, a peaceful and functional society is 
needed before democratization gets on its way. However, 
regardless of which route is taken first, it is very important 
that the perception and participation of the locals is taken 
into account (Talentino, 2007). „The peace process should 
not be imposed upon an unwilling and disengaged public‟ 
(Newman and Richmond, 2006: 16). The only way peace is 
going to hold is if the locals themselves have committed to 
it.  
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While it is very difficult to anticipate what will and will not 
work in a deeply divided society, Bosnia and Kosovo have 
shown that if the causes of the conflict are still present and 
not dealt with, the chances for progress are not very 
promising. The problematic issue with Kosovo in particular 
was the task that the UN was entrusted with. There was a 
lack of consideration by either NATO or any other actor for 
the capabilities of the UN to handle duties that it had never 
done before (Pula, 2003). Writing in 2001, Booth‟s 
impression was put in the following terms: „A year after the 
war is over…nobody believes that ethnic harmony, the rule 
of law and human security are imminent in the province‟ (p: 
1). Sadly, eight years on, Booth‟s impression still holds 
strong. Things have not improved much in any of those 
areas.  
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Chapter Three 
 
CIVPOL as Kosovo‟s national police: How does the 
diversity of CIVPOL affects its work in practice? 
           
 
The UN members had seventy eight emergency days during 
the NATO bombardment over what was left of Yugoslavia 
and eight years experience in the region to prepare for the 
situation in Kosovo. Yet, when the NATO airstrikes ended, 
the UN was as unprepared to deal with the aftermath as it 
would have been if the crises had developed over night. Not 
knowing where to begin, the SC passed Resolution 1244, 
which amongst other requirements, demanded Yugoslavia 
to withdraw all its security forces from Kosova including the 
police (para. 3). Further, Resolution 1244 decided that the 
international presence will include the deployment of 
international police personnel to serve in Kosovo (para. 
11(i)). The police personnel who serve under the auspices 
of the UN are widely known as CIVPOL (the acronym for 
civilian police). Before talking about the duties of CIVPOL 
during a peace operation it is important to know about the 
personnel first. The use of the term UN CIVPOL, if not 
explained properly, it can be misleading for many who have 
not had a direct experience with the UN „police service‟.  
   
Although from 1990 a small unit of CIVPOL is based in New 
York to support the officers who serve on the ground, the 
UN does not have a stand by police force that would be 
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ready for deployment as soon as it is needed. To conduct its 
tasks, the UN is entirely dependent on its member states 
(Dobbins et al, 2005). As a result the officers who serve 
during a peace operation are sent from their country of 
origin straight to the country hosting the UN operation and 
it is up to the national government to decide upon the 
quality and quantity of officers. Hence, sometimes the UN 
ends up trying to choose the best out of the worst and due 
to the desperate need to fill the quota for a certain 
operation the need for good officers has to be sacrificed 
(Call and Barnett, 2000).  CIVPOL on the ground operates 
rank free, which plays a very negative part in assigning 
duties. The officers that operate on the ground wear the 
normal uniform they wear in their country of origin. Even 
though they are meant to wear a blue UN beret, it is very 
rare to see a CIVPOL member wearing one in Kosovo. 
Therefore, even though the UN portrays a different figure in 
theory, what you see on the ground is a German, English, 
Turk, Jordanian, or any other officer. In other words, they 
represent their country not the UN.  Uniform is not the only 
aspect by which officers represent their country. 
Unfortunately, most of the time they represent the practice 
of their country in every other aspect, and because of how 
the UN operates in general, there is very little that can be 
done about it, unless a new approach is sought. O‟Neill has 
a very simple example of the impossibility to improve the 
CIVPOL practice under the present conditions. As he 
explains, after the UN was given the mandate to go to 
Kosovo, „the overworked and badly understaffed CIVPOL 
unit in New York started a mad scramble to find police 
officers who could drop what they were doing and head off 
to a distant place‟ (2002: 100). Due to the urgency of the 
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deployment, the officers were thrown out on the streets of 
Kosovo without knowing properly what their duties were, 
what law they were meant to apply and no background 
information about the conflict and the nature of the society 
they were meant to police (King and Mason, 2006). Before 
expanding in this last point, I will mention very briefly the 
short history of CIVPOL.  
 
Prior to 1989, a peace operation was widely conduced on 
the principle that the UN personnel were to act as an 
impartial referee (Broer and Emery, 1998). Therefore the 
police duties were generally carried out by the military. The 
only two missions prior to that time that had a component 
of CIVPOL were the mission in Congo and Cyprus, both in 
the 1960s (ibid). However, as the role of the UN changed 
after the Cold War, this reflected the need for a CIVPOL to 
fulfil the new demands. The number of CIVPOL jumped from 
35 in 1988 to 3500 in 1997 and to nearly 8000 in 2001 
(Fitzsimmons, 2007).  While the monitoring and training of 
local police forces and helping with the elections were the 
main duties of the new CIVPOL, they did not have any 
enforcement powers. Even in dangerous missions, as the 
one in Bosnia, CIVPOL did not have handguns, which made 
their duties very difficult and the need for a military back up 
to deal with armed local police who were not performing in 
line with the new democratic standards. While the CIVPOL 
tasks are getting more complex every day, the UN has 
failed to make any drastic changes to match up with the 
new demands. This has led some to consider that the UN 
security mechanisms are in a state of crisis (Roberts, 
1996). As a result, most of the monitoring operations have 
been characterised with many shortcomings on the side of 
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CIVPOL. It has been expressed many times that most 
civilian police are poorly selected, trained and equipped, 
and have no knowledge of the hosting country nor the UN 
doctrine to be implemented (McFarlane and Maley, 2001; 
Bayley, 2006; Call and Barnett, 2000). While this would 
have played its down side in the successful progress of any 
operation, at least most of the post war societies still had 
their own police to carry out their day to day duties. In 
Kosovo things were very different. The CIVPOL had to carry 
out every possible duty that is connected with policing, for 
which they were not prepared. To argue that CIVPOL in 
Kosova at best was trying to perform an impossible task 
and at worst was useless, I will have to rely a lot on my 
own experience as a local police officer in Kosovo, as there 
is very little literature that deals with CIVPOL and its role as 
Kosova‟s national police. In order to get a better account of 
the CIVPOL situation in Kosova, it has to be looked in the 
context of the UN as a whole in that territory, therefore, 
some legitimacy and accountability aspects will be dealt 
with in the next chapter.  
 
  
CIVPOL challenges in Kosovo 
 
„In order to perform its functions of maintaining public law 
and order properly, the UN police [in Kosovo] were armed 
and had been given power to make arrest and detain 
suspects. In addition to assuming public order functions, 
[they] took charge of internal security as well as border 
control‟ (Jeong, 2005: 59). 
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CIVPOL was meant to apply democratic standards to 
perform these duties, but as Bayeley asks: „since the UN 
has no manual on democratic policing when you arrive, 
where do you begin? How do you harmonise policing 
doctrines among UN personnel from 34 countries (in the 
case of Kosova, around 50 countries) many of these 
countries minimally democratic themselves? (2006: 6). How 
do you manage to have a functional police service with 
members from many different countries, who apply 
different norms, laws, and systems, in matter of days? Well 
the short answer is, is just impossible. The simple truth 
about CIVPOL in Kosovo is that it never functioned properly, 
not after few weeks, not after few months, not until it left 
after nearly a decade. What about the complicated truth? 
 After the Serbian administration and security forces left 
Kosovo, until CIVPOL arrived a few weeks (months) later, 
some consider that period as a security vacuum (Rausch, 
2007). That is partially untrue. After state structures fail, 
political power and security is exercised in less formal ways 
(Chesterman et al 2004; Reno, 2008; Chesterman, 2004). 
The same happened in Kosova. The KLA members, some of 
whom were inside Kosovo all along, and some waiting 
around the borders, set up their own administration and 
security regime in a matter of hours. During the NATO 
airstrikes they did not have the problems that the SC was 
experiencing. The KLA political leaders had coordinated 
everything and they were all ready as soon as Serbian 
forces left. Due to the organisational problems that the UN 
has (which have been mentioned above), UNMIK in general 
and CIVPOL in particular were very slow to arrive. 
Therefore, those few first months played a crucial role in 
how things were to develop later on and proved a real 
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struggle for CIVPOL to take matters into their own hands 
(King and Mason, 2006). Upon arrival CIVPOL was facing 
difficulties from all sides. In a normal situation, in most 
countries, police are part of a chain of institutions that form 
the Criminal Justice System. Kosovo no longer had any of 
those formal structures which are crucial for a police service 
to function properly. Even though UNMIK was mandated to 
establish a state justice system (Bull, 2008), resolution 
1244 was silent on how that was to be achieved. There was 
no mention of how to appoint judges, prosecutors, or any 
other formal appointments that are needed for a justice 
system to start functioning. The Serbian judges had fled 
Kosovo and the Albanian professionals had been kicked out 
almost ten years before hand by the Milosevic regime. Thus 
UNMIK was forced to hire any judge or prosecutor willing to 
do the job, since hiring international legal professionals was 
not allowed at the start. However, once it was proven that it 
was impossible to have fair trials in ethnically motivated 
crimes, international personnel was the only option, even 
though they ended up taken other cases as well. The 
confusion about the laws to be applied in Kosovo became 
another problem that undermined the authority of UNMIK. 
UNMIK regulation 1999/1 stated that Kosovo was to apply 
the law of pre 24 March 1999, thus reinforcing the harsh 
laws that Milosevic applied illegally in Kosovo for a decade.  
It was no surprise that the returning Albanian judges and 
prosecutors refused to apply them. This forced the SRSG to 
reverse its decision in a new Regulation (1999/24) and 
decide that the new law to be applied was the law of 22nd of 
March 1989 (Kosovo Criminal Code). In both cases 
international human rights standards had to take precedent. 
However, this last move annoyed the Serbian judges, who 
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decided that they would still use the Milosevic law. Thus 
individuals were tried differently depending on who their 
judge was (Rausch, 2007).  
However no matter what game UNMIK was playing at the 
top, its decisions were not reaching the CIVPOL on the 
ground. There was a lack of any written materials to be 
supplied to the officers on the ground. Even when it was 
supplied, it was not working very well. From what I have 
experienced, policing is not always about applying the law 
in its strict written form, especially after it has been 
translated for law enforcers who are not familiar with 
anything around them and were never the intended users of 
those rules. However, many times, using common sense did 
not seem part of the UN manuals and its personnel. To 
illustrate this I will use a simple example. Kosova only has 
one main road that connects the east (capital Prishtina) 
with the west (Peja) that leads on to Montenegro. It is not a 
Highway, nor a Motorway, not even a second style western 
road. It is merely a two lane (one in each direction) road, 
and over eighty percent of it cuts through farm lands. The 
only way farmers can get access to their land is by crossing 
that road. Most of the sub roads that join it are muddy 
when it rains and dusty when it is dry. One day I was 
patrolling with a German officer and since my English was 
considered sufficient (it should be noted that the UN 
„sufficiency‟ is considerably lower than the general meaning 
of the term) my patrol did not have an interpreter most of 
the time. As we were driving on patrol, a farmer driving his 
tractor crossed the main road and since it had been raining, 
it deposited mud along the road. The German officer 
followed him and asked him to stop. He asked the farmer 
for vehicle documents (he somehow did not know that 
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tractors were not being registered in post war Kosovo yet) 
and told him that he was going to issue him a ticket for 
dirtying the main road. I simply could not believe my ears, 
but then I was the only bridge that they could communicate 
through. I tried to explain to the officer that the article he 
was pointing at was for town and city purposes and not for 
that road. He then turned to me and said that in Germany 
you issued a ticket for the same reason. What could I say, 
except losing my patience, telling him in a nasty way that 
regardless of if he liked it or not he had to apply the Kosova 
law not the German one, and despite lacking any authority 
to contravene the decision of a CIVPOL officer I asked the 
farmer to go home. The farmer started thanking me. I 
turned around and said to him that I was not doing him a 
favour I just had to teach the German officer how to apply 
the law in Kosovo. To my surprise the farmer said, I 
thought it was him who came here to teach you, which it 
was true since I still was in my probationary period. I was 
being brave and stupid, since regardless if I was right; 
technically my behaviour warranted a suspension from duty 
or even a permanent dismissal. However, even when a local 
officer did not step in to put matters right, they were still 
being punished. On one occasion, a police patrol car, from 
the Peja region drove across the border into the 
Montenegro. Subsequently all officers in it were arrested by 
the Montenegrian police. After being brought back to the 
Peja police station, the CIVPOL member (allegedly from 
India) who was driving the car in question and was in 
charge of the patrol, managed to successfully argue that he 
was not aware where the border was and it was the local 
officers who should have kept him right. The local officers 
were suspended from duties despite the fact the CIVOL 
 46 
 
officer in question had so many warnings on the road to 
Montenegro. Prior to crossing the border there was a 
massive KFOR check point followed by a huge sign (in 
English) to say that you were leaving Kosovo, and further 
on another huge sign saying you were entering the neutral 
zone between Kosovo and Montenegro. Only all those who 
have experienced being in CIVPOL patrol car with full blast 
music on would understand how could such a thing could 
have happened.    
 
The situation in criminal matters was even worse. Many 
CIVPOL officers, who came from autocratic regimes, have no 
knowledge of human rights (Caplan, 2005) or democratic 
principles. Many CIVPOL lack sufficient knowledge of English 
and in the case of Kosova none could speak the local 
language. Therefore, apart from confusing criminal laws, 
they relied on interpreters to perform their duties, and 
simple misunderstandings ended up with huge 
consequences for the defendant on further investigation or 
subsequent trial. No suspect had access to legal advice22, 
and minors, as well as lacking advice, were being 
questioned by police and prosecutors without the presence 
of any adults. In simple terms, CIVPOL was getting nowhere 
near establishing any kind of rule of law in Kosova, never 
mind the democratic one. But who was to blame? 
 
„...good policing practice is ought to be carried out 
according to clearly defined and publicised standards with, 
and on behalf of a broadly inclusive community...policing 
                                               
22 Rausch manages to fit even this general problem amongst political lines by pointing out 
that Serbs did not have legal advice which leaves the reader to wrongly assume that the 
rest of suspects who belonged to other ethnic groups did have legal advice (2007: 283). 
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relates to territory and population‟ (Goldsmith and 
Sheptycki, 2007). 
CIVPOL had neither of those, no defined standards, no 
inclusive community and above all it did not relate to the 
territory and the population. Many officers had no idea 
about the local customs and traditions, and certainly no 
knowledge about the conflict. Too much emphasis was put 
on the political crime and very little on the CIVPOL duties to 
police the rest of the crimes. In the first few months security 
in Kosova rested with the KFOR (Kosovo Force), who is not 
trained to deal with normal police duties. Therefore to look 
for an easy answer, the security meant an end to political 
violence but not as a means to stabilize the life in Kosova. 
The waves of post war crimes posse enormous challenges 
for the „reconstruction of state institutions, legitimising new 
democratising regimes and for the quality of justice and 
everyday life of the population‟ (Call, 2007: 378). The time 
it took the CIVPOL to arrive in Kosova, it was long enough 
for organised crime to settle its routes there.  The horror 
stories (most of which were untrue) of the kidnapping of 
young girls and children to use them for sexual exploitation, 
soon overcame the war horrors that the locals thought they 
had left behind. The justice in Kosovo started being carried 
out by guns and intimidation, not by customary or codified 
criminal laws. CIVPOL simply had too much to catch up with. 
Furthermore it never understood its role as Kosovo‟s only 
police force and it never had the capacity to perform as 
such.  
 
The wrong perception of CIVPOL capacities to perform in 
such daunting and chaotic situation just added more to an 
already struggling civil administration. Most of the literature 
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does not recognise the more serious problems of CIVPOL in 
these situations (Call and Barnett, 2000). While the lack of 
CIVPOL‟s manpower, logistics, trained officers and many 
other things did not help, all these shortcomings were of a 
secondary nature in Kosovo. Even if CIVPOL had all these 
capacities from the very first day, the lack of a coordinated 
police force that is needed to police a certain territory 
cannot be organised from as many as fifty different 
countries to police a society whose language they cannot 
speak. An officer may be perfectly trained to do his or her 
job but that has been done in a different environment. The 
use of force and failure to apply the UN principles became 
one of the everyday problems (O‟Neill, 2002). A police 
station in Kosovo could have had as many as thirty different 
nationalities at one time. Many male CIVPOL officers had 
never worked with female officers before, and a lot of them 
did not take it well. Sexual harassment became an 
unnecessary burden for local and CIVPOL female officers. I 
witnessed quarrels between CIVPOL officers for this very 
reason, which was not being taken well in on the eyes of 
locals. Furthermore the progress of individual local officers 
depended on the nationality of the CIVPOL officer they were 
working with, and the performance of police stations across 
Kosova widely depended on where the international staff 
originated. A substantial number of CIVPOL arrived in 
Kosovo from administrative staff back in their countries 
(O‟Neill, 2002) and as it turned out they were useless in 
Kosovo, yet UNMIK could not turn them back. There did not 
seem to be any sort of system in place that would put 
CIVPOL officers in the positions that would match their 
experience in their country. Key positions such as 
investigating crime and training investigation units were 
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occasionally filled with riot officers, who were lacking 
experience in these fields. They were in charge of preparing 
files for courts, but many times people escaped any sort of 
punishment, having been charged with the wrong crime. 
CIVPOL members who had English as their native language 
sat the UNMIK English competency tests that were 
conducted by Russian CIVPOL members. In short, it was a 
complete mess, and it could have been done better if filling 
the quota was not considered the top priority. The other 
failure in planning a police force in Kosovo was the 
approach towards ex-police officers that had served under 
the Yugoslav (Kosova‟s autonomous) government.  Kosovo 
had many ex- police officers who despite the lack of 
knowledge of human rights and democratic principles 
(which was present amongst many CIVPOL members 
anyway) could speak the local language, knew the local 
principles, and had a greater advantage of understanding 
and applying the applicable law in Kosovo. Yet, they were 
never seen as such. Furthermore they were not put in the 
priority of the first groups of new recruits for the Kosovo 
Police Force (KPS) which would have helped a great deal in 
the policing performance in Kosovo.      
 
Even though security in Kosovo was always put against 
political violence, the halting of that violence would only 
stop a fraction of the insecurity that locals feel. Everybody 
in Kosovo would feel secure only if three fundamental 
challenges have been overcome: corruption, organised 
crime and ethnic bias (Jones et al, 2005). As I have pointed 
above the reluctance of first few months (and as it turned, 
out it continued ever after) to deal with crimes that involved 
armed and organised groups from all sides of Kosovo‟s 
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ethnicities resulted in a state of fear in Kosovo. Threatening 
judges, prosecutors, CIVPOL officers and not to mention the 
local officers who worked in the towns where they grew up 
and knew everybody, became a way of applying for bail. As 
a result, human, drugs and arms trafficking were flourishing 
in Kosovo and sometimes CIVPOL was contributing to this 
lawlessness that they were supposed to control (see Call 
and Barnett 2000 for examples on this last point). Some 
local officers did not fall behind either. On the other hand 
those many CIVPOL and later local officers who were keen 
to do their job properly were fighting a lost battle. For 
example, if a café bar was raided in the first years and 
foreign females were found, there were no guidelines on 
immigration or work permits. Even though the officers were 
a hundred percent sure that those females were either 
willingly or by force working as prostitutes, as long as they 
did not say that, nothing could be done. Many times a bar 
with two or three tables would have ten or twenty 
„waitresses‟ or „cleaners‟.  
 
Since the „ordinary‟ crime after the war ended in Kosovo 
was not being directed towards foreigners, and did not pose 
a threat to reignite the war the international media lost 
interest in it (Call, 2007). However, the insecurity that was 
produced by this kind of crime turned Kosovo‟s society into 
„deaf and mute‟. Fearing for their own and their families‟ 
safety nobody was willing to report or testify on any crimes. 
Many local officers were also considered by locals as not of 
good standing in the society. However, the poor vetting 
system that was used by UNMIK and CIVPOL to select the 
new members of the KPS could have not spotted that. After 
all there were no criminal records against which to check 
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individual names. As long as one did not figure on the list of 
war crimes, it seemed „alright‟ to have committed any other 
crime. This will be one of the many drawbacks in Kosovo‟s 
struggle to have a strong, democratic and politically 
independent police force for the coming years. To make 
matters even worse for the local citizens the „efforts to 
show „progress‟ exemplified one of KFOR‟s and UNMIK‟s 
greatest flaws: spinning information to make it appear that 
the situation in Kosovo is „under control‟ when this [was 
not] the case‟ (O‟Neill, 2002). The legacy of comparing data 
is still present in Kosovo today and so are the organised 
crime and every other negative phenomenon that 
accompany it, corruption being the worst. As late as 2007 
there were media reports in Kosovo that in order to keep 
their positions the government and the criminals had 
become „friends‟. However, even worse is the impossibility 
of the local societies to draw a line between where one 
group starts and the other ends, not only in Kosovo, but in 
the whole Balkan region.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The UN and its accountability in Peace Operation: 
Are UN members accountable to the UN, their own 
Country, or do they sit above the law? 
 
Transitional Administrations, such as the one in East Timor 
and Kosovo represent the most complex and unique 
operations attempted by the UN, probably never to be 
repeated again (Einsiedel, 2002). In both cases the UN was 
given the duty to govern the territory. However the 
circumstances upon which the transitional administration 
was to be conducted were different. The duty of the UN in 
East Timor was to help with the referendum and the process 
of passing control from Indonesia to a new independent 
East Timor, whereas in Kosovo the final statute was to be 
decided at a later stage. Therefore, the length of time the 
UN was to be in Kosovo was unlimited and nobody knew 
what its final statue was going to be and when it was going 
to be decided. As a result, I consider the issue of 
accountability as very important in this particular situation, 
especially if it was anticipated from the very beginning that 
the UN may rule Kosovo for a long time due to the 
impossibility of finding a common ground between the 
warring parties there. Throughout this paper, I have tried to 
avoid discussing the issue of the legitimacy of the UN 
interventions in intrastate conflicts. I have used two 
reasons for that. First, if the UN has been deployed that will 
be taken as an indication that SC has already given its 
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blessing. Second, one only needs to count the number of 
these kinds of interventions during the last two decades to 
realise that this issue does not seem to be important 
anymore. However it has to be acknowledged that if the UN 
takes upon itself to rule a territory, its accountability 
towards the people it de facto rules is a far more pressing 
issue. 
 
The SC Resolution 1244, that gave UNMIK the mandate to 
administer Kosovo, did not include any obligation on that 
mission to consult the local population. The appointment of 
the head of UNMIK was only to be consulted with the SC 
(para. 6). Even though it has been noted that the parties in 
the Balkans were not always receptive of the aims of the 
international community (Caplan, 2005), the legal 
accountability should have been dealt with separately. 
However, as it turned out, the SRSG ended up passing 
Regulations in Kosovo with the power to disregard any 
preposition of the local community that was given through 
different groups and councils that UNMIK created there. 
One of the first things that UNMIK did was to pass 
Regulation 1999/1 which stated that SPSG authorised 
himself to make any decisions in Kosovo whatsoever, 
including the appointment and removal of any person to 
perform functions in the civil administration which included 
the judiciary. This Regulation proves perfectly well the 
claims that Kouchner (the SRSG who signed the above 
regulation) read Resolution 1244 twice each morning and 
still had no idea what „substantial autonomy‟ meant 
(Chesterman, 2004). While Resolution 1244 had guaranteed 
the sovereignty of Yugoslavia by giving Kosova a substantial 
autonomy, it turned out that neither was going to happen in 
 54 
 
practice. UNMIK took both, the sovereignty of Yugoslavia 
over Kosovo, and the substantial autonomy from Kosova‟s 
people. To sum up all these points, I will cite the report of 
the Ombudsperson in Kosovo which in 2002 stated:   
 
„...UNMIK is not structured according to democratic 
principles, does not function in accordance with the rule of 
law, and does not respect important international human 
rights norms. The people of Kosovo are therefore deprived 
of protection of their basic rights and freedoms three years 
after the end of the conflict by the very entity set up to 
guarantee them. 
On its establishment as the surrogate state in Kosovo, in 
1999, UNMIK gave no cognizance to one of the founding 
principles of democracy, the separation of governmental 
powers‟.    
                                                                                                                                       
(OIK Report, 2002) 
 
Despite growing complaints and discontents, UNMIK 
retained its powers until it was forced to leave those parts 
of Kosova that are not considered as „Serb enclaves‟23.  
However, even though the head of UNMIK had authority to 
make every decision in Kosovo regarding the local 
population, the situation between international actors rested 
on different grounds. UNMIK had very limited authority to 
deal with many different organisations in post-war Kosovo. 
                                               
23 As KFOR entered Kosovo in 1999, members of the Serbian community gathered around 
some of the villages and towns that had Serb majority. They were protected by KFOR 
(and still are) and are known as „Serb enclaves‟. They are maintained and financed by 
both Belgrade and Prishtina, and work as parallel structures in Kosovo. During the time 
UNMIK was in charge of Kosova they never recognised it. However, when Kosovo declared 
independence and many States recognised it, it was argued by majority in Kosovo that 
Resolution 1244 was no longer valid and UNMIK had to go. When a European mission took 
over to replace UNMIK, Serbs in Kosovo decided that they would still want UNMIK to look 
after them. That is still the case today.  
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In the case of KFOR it had no authority at all. Therefore, a 
short discussion on this particular point will be part of the 
next section. 
 
 
The UN‟s role as first amongst equals in Kosovo 
 
„The term „UN Peacekeeping‟ suggests that a ready 
recognisable and organised body was, and is, engaged in 
clear and understood form of activity in pursuit of a certain, 
clear goal. But is that so?‟   (O‟Neill, 2002a) 
 
NATO‟s decision to stop Milosevic without the permission of 
the SC and the marching of the Russian military personnel 
in Prishtina hours before the NATO lead force was meant to 
enter the territory, were only two of the many slip ups that 
questioned the UN‟s international political authority. Both 
occasions also were a big indication of the difficulties that 
international community was experiencing to deal with the 
Kosovo question. Resolution 1244 kind of addressed the 
former issue post facto, but the latter was a headache for 
years to follow. The Russians seized Kosovo‟s only airport 
which was meant to be under the control of British troops, 
and it took years of „negotiations‟ to get it back24.  
 
During the NATO airstrikes against the Milosevic regime, 
discussions were taking place between the powerful 
countries to decide which international organisation will be 
                                               
24 As far as the locals were concerned, the only reason why the Russians left is because 
their government had no money to pay them anymore. It was alleged that the British 
troops ended up giving them supplies of food and water until a decision was reached for 
their removal. 
 56 
 
in charge to rebuild Kosovo. Even though OSCE 
(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) was 
the favourite one at the start, things were getting very 
complicated on the ground, and a month before the war 
ended, the UN and OSCE were still waiting for a final 
decision (Caplan, 2005). In the end the UN was to hold the 
umbrella even though the EU and NATO took on a big 
proportion of activities that went on underneath, not to 
mention many sub-contractors that were present 
everywhere. Resolution 1244 had provided for the 
establishment of UNMIK „as a part of the international civil 
presence‟ (Annex 2, part 5), which left open the possibility 
of many things to be decided. Even though the head of 
UNMIK was at the top of the transitional pyramid, duties on 
the ground were split up amongst many actors, which made 
collaboration very difficult and accountability next to 
impossible.  
 
The civil side of the administration was made of Four Pillars. 
The First Pillar was to deal with humanitarian assistance 
which was given to UNHCR (two years later this pillar was 
transformed into police and justice and later transformed 
again into the office of the SRSG as „the Rule of Law 
Office‟). The Second Pillar dealt with civil administration 
(which included the CIVPOL and courts) and was given to 
the UN. The Third Pillar dealt with institution building and 
was given to OSCE and the Fourth Pillar dealt with the 
economic reconstruction was given to the European Union 
(EU).  KFOR (NATO lead Force in Kosovo) was in charge of 
the security, and even though it had one overall 
Commander, KFOR was split in five main sectors (US, 
Britain, France, Italy and Germany). Each sector had 
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different nationalities under their command and each had to 
conduct its duties within their boundaries25. The boundary 
lines between KFOR were often used as a joke that 
Albanians had fought for one republic and now they were 
given five. The KFOR Commander was responsible to NATO 
directly and not the Head of UNMIK.  With four institution 
under the one roof (the UN, UNHCR, EU and OSCE) UNMIK 
suffered from having too many masters (King and Mason, 
2006). As that was not bad enough for UNMIK, the way 
duties were split between them proved even more difficult. 
The OSCE had to build the institutions while the UN had to 
control them. The situation with the police was an example 
of a typical confusion that went on about who had to do 
what. The KPS were selected and vetoed by UNMIK, then 
went to a college run by OSCE, then went back for field 
training run by UNMIK, then went back for further training 
by the OSCE. This made it very difficult to have a 
continuous assessment of officers by the same standards. It 
has been claimed that the OSCE in Kosovo never fired any 
of its staff for poor performance (ibid). On the other hand 
all the humanitarian organisations had their own 
independent rules, and most of the time help never reached 
where it was needed. Big cities that were closer to the eye 
of international media always benefited more than the 
remote areas that were destroyed completely during the 
war. Flag-waving became far more important than helping 
Kosovo. 
   
                                               
25 There are detailed information about the structures and every other information about 
KFOR in their official website www.nato.int/kfor 
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While the above, rather short and deformed picture should 
give an idea of UNMIK‟s difficulties to account for possible 
misconducts of the international personnel in Kosovo, the 
UNMIK regulation 2000/47 was the final straw. It gave 
immunity against any legal proceedings to all UNMIK 
members, KFOR members, and all their subcontractors and 
local staff. The above regulation left open the possibility of 
the Secretary General to waive the immunity of UNMIK 
members if doing so would not prejudice the interest of 
UNMIK. However, the immunity of KFOR could only be 
waived by their Commanders. It has to be noted that third 
party members have immunity against locals for the right 
reasons, however the administration in Kosovo was not run 
by locals, rather by third parties themselves. Therefore, 
structures should have been put in place to address the 
unprecedented situation in Kosovo. I found it very difficult, 
not to say impossible, to find any academic literature that 
treats the issue of accountability of actors that take part in 
a peace operation in detail. The issue is dealt with in broad 
terms and mostly in cases where the UN was not playing 
the role of the sole executive and legislative authority of a 
territory. Chesterman (2004) is one of the authors that deal 
with this issue in more depth, but, he explicitly states in his 
book that he will not deal with the individual accountability 
issue. Rawski (2002) has gone a step closer by pointing out 
many of the flaws of individual immunity. However, in many 
of the individual cases he mentions there are no official 
data, which makes it very difficult to know what happened 
in details. Therefore, I find it appalling how such an 
important issue has not been given more attention.  I 
strongly believe that one of the crucial steps to make future 
UN or any third party operation succeed is their 
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accountability towards the people they rule. If a member of 
international personnel or a humanitarian organisation in 
whatever country does not fear any responsibility for their 
actions, the chances for misconduct of some are always 
going to jeopardise the good will of others. During my time 
in Kosovo from the beginning of UNMIK rule until the end of 
2002, no local ever knew where to turn for help if they were 
mistreated individually or collectively by the different 
international actors that were helping UNMIK put Kosovo 
back together. Even though Kosovo‟s Ombudsperson was 
established by OSCE in November 2000, the office had no 
power to enforce any decisions and was not allowed to deal 
with complaints against KFOR (Chesterman, 2004). 
Furthermore, most crimes that involved international staff 
were dealt with politically not legally. It simply felt that the 
„internationals‟ were above the law. Major incidents, even 
those resulting in deaths have shown that the UN lacks any 
structure or power to deal with such matters. In 2007, two 
protesters were killed in Kosova by Romanian members of 
CIVPOL during a protest in Prishtina. After an investigation 
was launched, it was concluded that their death was caused 
by the improper use of rubber bullets (Amnesty 
international 2009). Even though UNMIK was meant to keep 
the Romanian officers in Kosovo until the truth came to 
light, the Romanian government repatriated them soon 
after the incident, and nobody was ever charged let alone 
convicted for the loss of two young lives (ibid). 
 
It has to be appreciated, that under its present structure, 
the UN relies entirely on the help of participating countries. 
Therefore, it cannot afford to name and shame anybody, 
fearing that countries will no longer give the much needed 
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support. As a result it rests upon individual governments to 
deal with the accountability of its members. Unfortunately, 
some of the participating governments are weak and 
corrupt themselves, which reflects negatively upon the 
performance of their contingents. For as long as the UN 
directly depends on participating members in every field of 
its actions, creating independent structures to deal with 
accountability issues of its staff on the ground may never 
happen.  
  
 
 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 61 
 
Chapter Five 
 
Calculating the results: Should the hosting country 
always be blamed for failing to do the right thing – 
not going to war in the first place? 
 
„The remarkable growth of peace-building activities and 
programs has occurred despite the lack of agreement upon 
ways of documenting the effects of success of these efforts‟ 
(Zelizer and Rubinstein, 2009: 1). Hence, there are many 
different ways of measuring the effect of peace operations, 
which could lead to opposite conclusions for the same 
operation. Although the aims and goals of each intervention 
are the best place to start, there are many other factors 
that will carry a substantial weight towards success or 
failure. For example, the assessment may come to different 
conclusions depending if it was carried out immediately 
after the international community has left, or after few 
years of an operations end. It has been argued that while 
short term considerations are important too, the long term 
ones are more important even though they are more 
difficult to evaluate (Druckman, 1997). Some clear cut 
measures of indications of failure can be done without going 
into much detail, with cases such as Somalia and Cyprus 
being two obvious examples of undisputable failures. In 
Somalia peacekeepers failed to prevent the escalation of the 
conflict and left due to renewed fighting, whereas in Cyprus 
peacekeepers never left for fear of conflict escalation (ibid). 
However, in order to help future peace operations, it is 
important to find out why a peace operation fails? Who was 
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to blame? Should we look for shared responsibilities and 
maybe make things better next time? 
 
In the face of growing demand of conflicts requiring 
international interventions to settle disputes between 
parties, arguably it can be said that the UN has been one of 
the leading actors. However, as conflicts have developed to 
e new complex level, the UN has failed to develop adequate 
strategies commensurate with diplomatic, military and 
humanitarian activities. This has lead to a limited success 
and at times the UN‟s failure on the field (Chopra, 1998). 
Even though it has been argued that the UN‟s failure to 
solve ongoing conflicts does not mean a failure of the UN 
peacekeeping per se, in order to help the UN get back on its 
feet, the new mandates have to be backed up with the 
necessary political and military sources (Schnabel and 
Thakur, 2001). To this end, the only way how the UN can 
stand the test of time, will be the willingness of the 
permanent five to give the UN its right to steer the vehicle 
assigned to its name. Otherwise, the UN will continue to be 
blamed for many things its SC decides upon, without any 
consideration of the UN‟s capabilities. The first thing the UN 
can do to turn things around is learning to say „no‟ to the 
SC. „The Secretary General must have the authority and 
courage of conviction to reject missions that have been 
approved because of confuse, unclear or severely under 
resourced mandates‟ (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001: 243). In 
contrary, the UN will be „volunteering‟ to be used as a stick 
for the permanent five, without much regard to its need of 
performing well in a peace operation. 
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When did UNMIK fail? 
 
If we want to be realistic when talking about peace 
operations, the first thing to admit is that the list of 
requirements that are needed in a peace operation can 
never be met with. Therefore, the next best thing to meet 
the emergency requirements is to make a list of priorities. 
Even though Kosovo was the first operation of its kind, the 
international community and especially the UN cannot use 
that as an excuse for its failure. Each operation will have its 
unique components that have not been seen before. Hence 
we cannot allow ourselves to use that as an excuse to 
escape our responsibilities. Instead the difficulties to 
understand and handle intrastate conflicts need to be 
addressed by a comprehensive peace-building approach 
(Truger, 2000). As it has been noted on the first Chapter, 
UNMIK was an impossible mandate from the very 
beginning. UNMIK‟s struggle to fulfil its duty in Kosovo was 
not primarily to any staff shortage, lack of finance or 
logistics. Even though all those shortages played their role, 
UNMIK‟s main challenge started with the mandate itself. 
The resolution 1244 never made clear what the UN was 
supposed to do in Kosovo. Due to the impossibility to find 
an agreement between the Serbs and the Albanians, which 
reflected on the behaviour of the five permanent members 
of the SC, resolution 1244 left open too many possibilities 
that worked against any future reconciliation between the 
two peoples. Being aware that the final statute could go 
either way, Serbs and Albanian were pulling in different 
directions. Trying to keep everybody happy in the short 
term, turned the mandate into one of those multitask 
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objects that do not perform well on any of them. The 
confusion that surrounded the final statue of Kosovo made 
all state-building activities highly politicised. Therefore, 
„UNMIK ended up interpreting its mandate according to 
developments in Serbia and the individual views of Special 
Representatives on the question of independence‟ (Bull, 
2008: 125). The situation was not assessed upon the 
historical facts that it was not only the war of late 1990‟s 
that caused the conflict in Kosovo. Kosovo was a place 
where a competition took place between two peoples for the 
same territory for hundreds of years. As a result nobody in 
Kosovo objected the bullying of everybody else, they just 
wanted their group to be on top (King and Mason, 2006). 
Hence, tackling this problem should have been the first 
priority on the peace-building agenda.  
 
To argue that the failure or success of a peace operation 
will depend on whether the causes of the conflict have been 
addressed, I will mention briefly three examples, all parts of 
the ex-Yugoslavian state. One of them will be Croatia which 
has been widely considered as a success and Bosnia and 
Kosovo that have been considered as failures. They all had 
similar problems on their route to independence and all of 
them fought for the same ideal – none of them wanted to 
be dominated by the other group. The Serb side that fought 
in all three countries was backed up by Milosevic‟s regime, 
which provided them with every possible means, including 
the heavy handed Yugoslavian Army, to try and keep the 
territories with Serb majorities under the Yugoslav rule 
(Serbian rule). When the international community 
intervened to restore peace in Croatia and Bosnia first, and 
Kosovo nearly four years later, the attitude of the locals 
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changed accordingly. The Dayton Agreement that was 
meant to sort out Bosnia and Croatia ended up in different 
outcomes on the ground. At the Dayton peace agreement 
Milosevic effectively abandoned Serbia‟s claims to those 
Croatian territories that had a longstanding ethnic Serb 
population, and agreed to support the transfer of territories 
to Croatia (Paris, 2004). This rendered local Serbs with no 
further support and outnumbered to fight against the 
Agreement. Hence, if they wanted a future within Croatia 
they had to work with the Croatian government. Things 
were a bit different in Bosnia. It seemed that Bosnia had to 
pay for the Croatian gain. Serbs in Bosnia were given their 
own republic (albeit within Bosnia‟s official borders) which 
accounted for half of the Bosnia‟s overall territory. The 
Serbs there knew all along that a weaker Bosnia would 
always be to their advantage if their plan was to join Serbia 
proper one day, and they worked very hard to make the 
implementation of the Agreement impossible. Kosovo 
followed the route of Bosnia to some extent. Since Milosevic 
was forced to agree about Kosovo‟s departure, the Serbs 
that remained in Kosovo were always supported by 
Belgrade. Creating parallel structures in Kosovo was a plan 
that Serbs used as a protest against Kosovo‟s possible 
independence. Therefore, I consider that the international 
community gave Belgrade the chance to block a possible 
reconciliation between the Serb and the Albanian 
community in Kosovo, by allowing it to run parallel 
structures there. In all three cases the length of the mission 
also depended on the same problem. The international 
presence in Croatia left after concluding that its job was 
done and Croatia can manage on its own, while in Bosnia 
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and Kosovo the international presence still stays strong and 
it will probably continue to do so for many years to come. 
Everybody who has been directly involved with a peace-
building operation knows very well that tackling the causes 
of the conflict is easier said than done. Furthermore, there 
were many other unaddressed issues with the peace 
operation in Kosovo that drove UNMIK to its failure. The 
mission as a whole was over extended and under equipped 
(Bull, 2008). As Call (2008) argues, there was not only 
insufficient commitment of international community but 
extensive presence without regard to the hosting society, as 
it happened in Kosovo, which resulted in more harm than 
good. The international community approach seems to be 
that the best way to solve the problems is simply to through 
money at it, rather than address long term issues 
(Mcfarlane and Maley, 2001). The poor coordination that 
existed between agencies in Kosovo was another major 
problem. Important objectives were not completed because 
of interagency rivalry (King and Mason 2006). On security 
matters KFOR and UNMIK worked independently and 
pursuit different goals, each interpreting resolution 1244 
differently. The lack of sharing information between KFOR 
and CIVPOL has been considered one of the major failures 
to stop the violence of March 2004 (ibid).  
„Ultimately, the critical factor for success or failure of peace 
maintenance rests with the role of the local community, 
whom the efforts is intended to help‟ (Chopra, 1998). As I 
have pointed above more than once the role of the local 
community was never considered important as part of the 
UNMIK‟s decisions.  
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Conclusion 
„The end of the Cold War marked the defeat of the ideology 
of the communism and the collapse of the ideology of the 
command economy by the forces of liberal democracy and 
market economy‟ (Chesterman et al, 2004: 1). The collapse 
of the bipolar system that divided the world between the 
west and the east created new opportunities for many 
nations across the globe. However, not all sides were ready 
for change, thus many conflicts became active again, 
majority being fought between groups that share the same 
sovereign territory. To try and manage these new conflicts 
the UN was forced to adjust in a way for which it was not 
initially designed (Knight, 1998). Despite the surface 
adjustments, however, deep inside the UN‟s approach to 
guard the sovereignty of its members still remained the 
same. This created difficulties, especially for many conflicts 
that needed quick and swift reaction. Hence, a new 
alternative was sought to address the intrastate conflicts, 
the commonly known „humanitarian intervention‟. This new 
way was used to argue NATO‟s military intervention in 
Kosovo. Even though there were huge disagreements 
between the members of the SC to the legitimacy of that 
intervention, the intention of this paper was not to deal with 
that matter; hence I have kept it silent. However, I do see 
the need to point out that despite any negative effects that 
the NATO intervention has caused, it did stop the 
humanitarian catastrophe that was unveiling in Kosovo and 
it did save people from the scourge of war, thus fulfilling 
one of the main UN principles (see chapter one above).  
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The problem with the humanitarian intervention raises 
another big issue for the UN.  
 
„The tendency to view conflict in terms of human rights 
abuses and victims clearly encourages intervention to 
support the claims of one side rather than intervention to 
negotiate a settlement‟ (Chandler, 2006: 174), hence  
jeopardising the UN‟s mandate to be impartial. Therefore, I 
have tried to bring out those components of the UN that are 
needed to change in order to settle future conflicts. Calls 
have been made for the UN to have its own army (Knight, 
1988) and maybe a stand by police force. However, I would 
be one of those people who would argue against that. There 
already exist a multinational army (NATO) which has rarely 
been used for its combat purposes.  Therefore, I would 
strongly argue that it is not the creation of new sources that 
the UN needs – changing the approach of how the actual 
sources are used will be far more effective. If all member 
states are committed to achieve the same goal, the 
diplomacy will reach to a successful settlement. However if 
they are not, the use of other means will always undermine 
the outcome. Kosovo is one of the examples where the UN 
did not fail because of the military absence or the police for 
that matter. It failed because of the wrong approach that 
was used to address the problem. The lack of coordination 
that existed on the ground in Kosovo had its sources all the 
way to the SC. Hence I would support the idea that it is 
both safer and more realistic to deal with disorders on a 
regional basis (Carpenter, 1997), while have the UN to be a 
coordinating body. However, to have a better control over 
Kosovo‟s final statue, the SC decided to deal with it through 
the UN, and it vested all the powers to the head of UNMIK 
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who was directly responsible to the Secretary General and 
not to the situation on the ground. It has been noted that in 
order to have success, „the legitimacy of taking over 
government functions should not be seen as stemming from 
the SC mandate alone, but should also derive from its 
performance on the ground and its respect for certain 
principles‟ (Einsiedel, 2002: 8). In Kosovo the opposite 
happened. UNMIK, trying to enforce democracy in a place 
that needed many other things beforehand, turned into a 
regime that started to lose the local support that it had 
from the majority of the population. As Chopra suggests: 
„No authority, malevolent or benign, can survive without the 
balance of the popular consent on its favour....Therefore the 
role local representatives play in a joint authority will have 
to be determined according to the specifics of the case‟ 
(Chopra, 1998: 9).  
The role of the local representatives was never clear in 
Kosovo and was never deal with as an important issue. 
Therefore, once Kosovo‟s parliament got stronger, it 
declared unilateral independence, which was supported and 
accepted by most of the important international actors, and 
more importantly it has been recognised by most of the 
Kosovo‟s and Serbia‟s neighbours. Even at this stage Serbia 
did not give up. It asked the UN to take an advisory opinion 
from the International Court of Justice on the legitimacy of 
Kosovo‟s independence. The Court decided that Kosovo‟s 
declaration of independence did not violate general 
international law, and did not violate resolution 1244. The 
court had to remind everybody that resolution 1244 did not 
contain any prohibition that would bar Kosovo to declare 
unilateral independence. As a result of both findings, the 
Court decided that Kosovo‟s independence was legitimate 
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(ICJ 2010). The decision of the International Court was not 
what Serbia expected, yet that decision did nothing to 
change Serbia‟s attitude towards the new reality.  
The unilateral declaration of independence was (is) not 
accepted by Serbia, but it did create a new reality that 
everybody involved had to accept and work around it. The 
new independent institutions rendered the transitional 
administration no longer effective, thus UNMIK ended its 
mandate in Kosovo without achieving either peace, or 
democracy. Officially UNMIK still operates in Kosovo only on 
those parts that have a Serbian majority, while rest of 
Kosovo is being monitored by EULEX (the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo). On the other hand the 
security in Kosovo is still being maintained by a heavy 
presence of KFOR.  
 
Starting the intervention in Kosovo without proper thought 
and a long term plan, there could have been no other 
outcome: There is no foreseeable future of the sustainable 
peace without the presence of the international community 
in Kosovo. Hence, there is no clear indication when the 
international community is going to leave the region. The 
life of Kosovo‟s citizens, regardless of who they are, has not 
changed to any great deal even ten years after the conflict. 
They still live without the most basics for a normal life: no 
electricity, no water, and no proper health system. The 
benefit system seems to be available only to those who 
have guns or are related to the staff. The unemployment is 
so high that even if the benefit system was fair to 
everybody it would not be able to cope anyway. The rule of 
law is undermined by corruption and unprofessionalism in 
every aspect of the judicial system and every other public 
 71 
 
service (OIK, 2008). The three parallel structures that were 
allowed to exist in Kosovo (UNMIK, Serbian and the 
Albanian structure which was later replaced by the 
democratically elected one that was made up of the 
Albanian majority and all the other minorities, including a 
proportion of Kosovo Serbs) played a decisive role to 
undermine the progress of a new, democratic Kosovo where 
everybody could live in peace. Kosovo‟s citizens no longer 
trust any political party, a feeling that was expressed by the 
very low turnout at the last election. They have realised 
that getting the long sought republic was not all it takes to 
get a better life. The strength and self-reliance of majority 
of people in Kosovo that managed to survive horrendous 
atrocities before and during the bloody conflict was kindly 
suffocated by the ten years of the UN autocracy.  
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